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1 Introduction
With the increasing importance of multinational firms, collecting corporate taxes in high
tax countries has become a challenging task. In contrast to local firms, multinational
corporations can shift profits to lightly taxed foreign locations, leading to substantial
losses in tax revenue. One important channel to reduce the global tax liability is the
transfer pricing of intracompany trade. Multinational firms can shift profits and minimize
the tax burden in high tax countries by overpricing imports from foreign subsidiaries, or
underpricing exports. To protect their tax base, tax authorities have adopted arm’s
length pricing (ALP) as the central principle in the taxation of multinational companies.
The principle is set out in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and governs
the prices at which transfers within a multinational company are set for the purposes
of tax. Such transfers can be of intermediate goods, produced by one company within
the multinational group and sold to another, or they can include a licence or royalty fee
paid for the right to produce and to use intellectual property owned by another part of
the group. The ALP is essentially the price at which the transaction would take place
between two independent agents. In many cases, it is diﬃcult in practice to identify a
price for the same product actually transferred between two independent agents. This
paper, however, is not concerned with the practical diﬃculties of implementing the ALP,
but rather with the underlying rationale. The principle seems to be based on the implicit
assumption that arm’s length prices observed in trade between independent firms are the
‘correct’ ones when assessing the value of intracompany trade of multinational firms. The
central point of this paper is that ALP might be an inappropriate benchmark and might
therefore introduce new distortions in the taxation of multinational firms.
The paper analyzes the consequences of the ALP in a general equilibrium model with
oﬀshoring of the production of components for the assembly of final goods by the parent
company in a high tax country (‘North’). Final goods producers can choose to oﬀshore
components to the ‘South’ either by entering an outsourcing relationship or by establishing
a wholly owned foreign subsidiary via foreign direct investment (FDI). The model endoge-
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nously explains arm’s length prices paid in outsourcing relationships among independent
firms and the prices used by multinational firms when importing the same components
from foreign aﬃliates. In both organizational forms, the final goods producer chooses a
profit maximizing contract in dealing either with an independent subcontractor or with
an aﬃliate company. To induce an eﬃcient organization of the total production chain,
the contract specifies a licence fee for the right to produce and a component price. FDI is
assumed to require a larger set-up cost compared to an outsourcing relationship with an
independent firm. Once these costs are sunk, ownership of the foreign production unit is
more profitable. Northern firms thus face a trade-oﬀ in choosing the organizational form
with the larger net present value. The more profitable firms aﬀord the higher set-up cost
in FDI and can exploit the advantages of ownership. The less profitable ones prefer an
outsourcing relationship.1
A key aspect of the model is that owning the foreign production unit is more valuable
than outsourcing to an independent firm, once the higher set-up cost is sunk. We assume
that all firms are endowed with limited own assets that allow for self-financing of initial
set-up costs. However, remaining assets are insuﬃcient to fully finance investment for
component production. Firms therefore need to raise additional funds on the external
capital market. External funding is subject to finance constraints as emphasized in the
corporate finance literature. Subsidiaries of multinational companies find it easier to over-
come finance constraints compared to independent subcontracting firms. Multinationals
can shift profits to a subsidiary by paying higher prices for components, thereby strength-
ening pledgeable income and facilitating external financing of the subsidiary. Furthermore,
ownership means that the parent firm does not need royalties to extract profits since it can
always get profits by means of repatriated dividends. In reducing free cash-flow, royalty
payments again impair the subsidiary’s debt capacity and are, thus, optimally set to zero.
Multinational firms thus choose rather high transfer prices and set low (zero) royalties,
1Our framework thus links to recent literature in international economics on firm heterogeneity, see
Melitz (2003), Antras (2005), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2004) and the survey by Helpman (2006).
The present paper adopts a simpler probabilistic framework as in Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009).
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extracting profits by means of dividend repatriation. The optimal outsourcing contract
instead features lower component prices and higher royalties. Royalties are high because
they are the only way to extract profits, and component prices are lower since the final
goods producer has no interest in shifting profits to independent subcontractors. As a
result, for purely economic reasons, and even in the absence of tax, optimal contracts
specify higher component prices and lower (zero) royalty fees for trade within multina-
tional firms compared to arm’s length relationships. Profit shifting by multinational firms
occurs for economic reasons, and is reinforced by corporate taxation.
In this situation, the ALP imposes a flawed benchmark in the taxation of multinational
firms. Applying the ALP in taxation of multinational firms forces them, for the purposes
of tax, to assess the value of intermediate imports at lower arm’s length prices and to
declare fictitious royalty income as observed in outsourcing relationships. Applying the
ALP thus imposes a tax penalty on multinationals when stating higher transfer prices
and not declaring royalty income. The results are the following: (i) the tax penalty leads
to lower transfer prices and less profit shifting; (ii) it reduces, in turn, debt capacity
and investment in the subsidiary; (iii) it pushes a margin of firms to choose outsourcing
rather than foreign direct investment and thereby distorts the extensive margin of business
organization; (iv) it strengthens tax revenue and raises national welfare in the North; (v) it
strongly reduces tax revenue and welfare in the South; (vi) it leads to a world-wide welfare
loss of first order magnitude. The last result is due to the fact that tax authorities, when
observing arm’s length prices, tend to misinterpret high transfer prices and low royalties
as a result of tax induced profit shifting while, in fact, these choices reflect an eﬃcient
organization of worldwide production by multinational firms.
We believe that the central implications of the paper are well supported by empirical
evidence. Our theory starts from the presumption that taxes induce international profit
shifting, see Devereux (2006) for a survey. Some papers estimate the responsiveness of the
corporate tax base to international diﬀerences in tax rates. Huizinga and Laeven (2008)
find that profit shifting leads to substantial redistribution of national tax revenue. They
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estimate a semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top statutory tax rate
of 1.3 which is substantial. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) calculate that at the margin
more than 60% of the additional revenue resulting from a unilateral tax increase is lost
due to income shifting.2 Other research more directly addresses the tax impact on transfer
prices. Bernard and Weiner (1990) distinguish between imports from a third party and
an aﬃliate and find systematic diﬀerences between transfer prices and ALPs but the
impact of the corporate tax is weak. Swenson (2001) estimates significant but relatively
small eﬀects of tax rates on transfer prices but her data do not allow diﬀerentiation
between intrafirm prices and ALPs. Clausing (2003) reports important diﬀerences in
the behavior of intrafirm trade prices compared to ALPs which are consistent with tax-
motivated income shifting. A 1% lower foreign tax rate is associated with 0.94% lower
intrafirm export prices and 0.64% higher import prices, relative to the tax eﬀects for
non-intrafirm goods. The results are highly significant. Bernard, Jensen and Schott
(2006) document that export prices of U.S. multinationals for intrafirm transactions are
significantly lower than prices for the same good sent to an arm’s length customer. On
average, the ALP is 43 percent higher than the related-party price. A decrease in the
corporate tax rate of one percentage point raises the gap between ALPs and related-party
prices by 0.56 to 0.66 percent.
The empirical literature does not explain which part of the price gap is due to taxes and
whether a substantial gap would remain for economic reasons in the absence of taxes. A
substantial theoretical literature in accounting has studied the role of transfer prices in the
governance of multinational firms. Harris and Sansing (1998) and Sansing (1999) study
the determination of ALPs and transfer prices and the choice of a manufacturing firm in
supplying the market either by staying vertically integrated or selling the product to an
independent distributor. All firms are monopolies and the choice of organizational form
2See also Grubert and Mutti (1991) for earlier results. These papers do not distinguish diﬀerent
channels of profit shifting, either by transfer pricing or internal debt. The importance of the debt channel
is documented in Desai, Foley and Hines (2004), Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2008), Mintz and
Smart (2004) and Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg and Winner (2009), among others.
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thus trades oﬀ the costs of double marginalization and the greater local market knowledge
of an independent seller. As in our paper, they show how the transfer pricing rules of the
U.S. treasury (comparable uncontrolled price method) can distort organizational choice
and production eﬃciency. Diﬀerent from our paper, the analysis is partial equilibrium
and abstracts from agency costs or incentive problems. Holmstrom and Tirole (1991)
study the determination of transfer prices, the design of managerial incentives and the
choice of organizational form in trading an intermediate good internally or externally.
Taxes are not part of the analysis. Smith (2002) instead focusses on the use of transfer
prices both for tax minimization and managerial incentives. While the main part of the
literature considers the case of one set of books, Baldenius, Melumad and Reichelstein
(2004) consider the role of internal transfer prices when there are two books, one used to
guide incentives and the other for tax purposes. Hyde and Choe (2005) study the same
issue. Their key insight is that the two prices are importantly related to each other. It
seems that tax authorities can easily inspect economic books whenever there is a need to
check transfer prices reported for tax purposes.3 Our analysis is based on one book.
Much of the tax literature does not address the role of transfer prices for the internal
organization of vertically integrated multinationals as compared to trade among indepen-
dent firms, and mostly abstracts from the choice between these two organizational forms.
The tax literature on transfer pricing either considers the ALP only in reduced form or
not at all, focussing instead on tax induced profit shifting, see Haufler and Schjelderup
(2000), for example. Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller and Schjelderup (2008) or Gresik and
Osmundsen (2008) discuss strategic considerations in choosing transfer prices, assuming
3Czechowicz, Choi and Bavishi (1982) report that 89% of U.S. multinationals use the same transfer
price for both purposes. A survey by Ernst and Young (2003) indicates that over 80% of parent com-
panies use a single set of transfer prices for management and tax purposes. The report mentions on
p. 17 that “... alignment of transfer prices with management views of the business can enhance the
defensibility of the transfer prices, ease the administrative burden, and add to the eﬀectiveness of the
transfer pricing program. In fact, in many countries management accounts are the primary starting point
in the determination of tax liability and diﬀerences between tax and management accounts are closely
scrutinized.”
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a well defined ‘true’ price for intracompany shipments. In Elizur and Mintz (1996), firms
use the transfer price to minimize global tax liabilities and to control the decisions of a
self-interested manager in a subsidiary company. There is no organizational choice and
no comparable price from arm’s length trade. Instead, their focus is on the interaction of
transfer pricing and tax competition.
The present paper is unique and the most complete in integrating the analysis of man-
agerial incentives, the determination of ALPs and internal transfer prices, and choice of
organizational form. In particular, it considers the new distortions introduced by forcing
multinationals to use ALPs in their tax report when, in fact, diﬀerent prices are optimal for
economic reasons. Another key innovation is to integrate the incentive problems studied
in corporate finance theory in a general equilibrium model of multinational firm decisions.
At the core of our model is a financing constraint due to capital market frictions, along the
lines of Tirole (2001, 2006) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). This part replaces the in-
complete contracting and bargaining framework of Antras (2005) who shows how residual
control rights from ownership can aﬀect firms’ oﬀshoring choice between outsourcing and
FDI. Antras, Desai and Foley (2009) have recently derived theoretical predictions from
a corporate finance model and tested them with firm-level data to explain how financing
frictions and institutional country characteristics such as investor protection can aﬀect
FDI flows and the scale of multinational activity (see also Manova, 2008, who finds credit
constraints to importantly aﬀect international trade flows). Desai, Foley and Hines (2004)
similarly found that multinational aﬃliates are financed with less external debt in coun-
tries with underdeveloped capital markets, reflecting significantly higher local borrowing
costs.
The paper develops the basic model in Section 2. Section 3 analyses the consequences
of imposing the arm’s length principle on the scale of production, organizational choice
as well as tax revenue and welfare in the world economy. Section 4 concludes.
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2 An Agency Cost Model
2.1 Basic Assumptions
The world economy consists of two regions, North and South. Firms in the North as-
semble a final numeraire good yj = βxj using intermediate inputs xj where β is a fixed
input output coeﬃcient. Components xj = f (lj) Ij are produced with capital Ij and
labor lj where f is a strictly concave and increasing function. The South is abundant in
cheap labor which motivates oﬀshoring of component production. The index j ∈ {o, i}
denotes the organizational form; firms can oﬀshore either by outsourcing to independent
subcontractors (index o) or by establishing an own subsidiary (index i). Production of
final goods is subject to a risky production technology in three stages. The first stage
consists of a fixed early stage investment kj which is specific to the organizational form.
It succeeds with probability q and fails with probability 1−q in which case the firm closes
down. The second stage involves a risky expansion investment Ij to prepare component
production which succeeds with probability p. If it fails with probability 1− p, the firm
again is closed down without any production. When both stages are successfully com-
pleted, components are produced and shipped to the North for assembly of the final good.
Assembly of final goods yj always occurs in the North where the early stage investment is
sunk. This fixed cost might capture the costs of further product development, marketing
and other skilled entrepreneurial tasks which cannot be oﬀshored to the South. Agents
are assumed risk-neutral with linearly separable preferences over income and eﬀort.
Each firm is endowed with own assets A and is run by a single entrepreneur or manager
who develop one risky project. Firms are heterogeneous in the success probability q of
early stage investment, with distributionG (qi) =
R qi
0
g (q) dq, while the success probability
p of the expansion stage is uniform.4 The life-cycle of a firm involves the following sequence
4Firms could be heterogeneous in several dimensions. Following Keuschnigg (2008), we assume het-
erogeneous success probabilities. This approach is in the line of the credit market literature reviewed
in DeMeza and Webb (1999). However, we avoid adverse selection in assuming self-financing of early
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of events: (i) a mass one of firms is born, i.e. we abstract from endogenous entry; (ii)
firms learn the type q ∈ [0, 1] of their project; (iii) they choose organizational form
j ∈ {o, i}, conditional on type q, and invest kj; (iv) When it survives the start-up phase,
the firm chooses expansion invest I in the South which is partly financed with external
funds; the manager of the subsidiary or the independent subcontractor chooses eﬀort,
leading to high or low success probability, p > pL, in the expansion stage. Investment
in component production is thus subject to moral hazard which introduces a financing
constraint; (v) When expansion stage is successfully completed, firms in the South hire
labor and produce components xj = f (lj) Ij, and the parent firms in the North produce
final output yj = βxj. We solve by backward induction.
Given a wage rate w in the South, component production yields a gross cash-flow per
unit of invested capital equal to
vj ≡ v (zj) = maxlj zjf (lj)− wlj, zjf 0 (lj) = w, v0 (zj) = f (lj) . (1)
where zo is the arm’s length price (ALP) chosen in an outsourcing relationship, and zi
is the internal transfer price chosen to control production decisions of a wholly owned
subsidiary company in the South.
Depending on organizational form, the parent company in the North faces a tax lia-
bility T nj and earns an expected net of tax profit
πnj = (β − zj)xjp+ rj + πj − T nj . (2)
The first term is the expected profit of the final goods division. The parent earns an
upfront royalty ro > 0 if it outsources to an independent firm in the South. In this
case, dividend income is zero, πo = 0, since all profit after paying the royalty goes to the
stage investment. In Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), firms diﬀer in terms of own equity A (free cash-flow,
strong or weak balance sheets) and can, thus, leverage investment by a variable amount. The new trade
literature reviewed in Helpman (2006) assumes firms to be heterogeneous in factor productivity, i.e. in-
vestment may result in high or low productivity. The present approach oﬀers a major simplification by
keeping firms symmetric when sharing the same organizational form.
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Southern producer. Alternatively, the parent firm may choose foreign direct investment
(FDI) and thereby turn into a multinational enterprise (MNE). In this case, it fully owns
the subsidiary company in the South and can either choose to extract profit by means of
a royalty ri > 0 or a repatriated dividend πi > 0.
The expected net present value of the firm of type q is
Vj (q) = q · πnj − kj. (3)
Depending on its type, early stage investment succeeds with probability q and yields profit
πnj , or fails with probability 1−q, leaving nothing. Knowing its type, the firm chooses the
organizational form yielding the highest net present value. Hence, a type q firm chooses
FDI if Vi (q) > Vo (q). Proposition 4 below will show that ownership yields a strictly larger
expected profit, πni > πno . To exclude FDI dominating outsourcing for all firms, we assume
that FDI is more expensive to set up, ki > ko, where we choose ko = 0 as a convenient
normalization. This parameterization introduces the key trade-oﬀ between ownership and
arm’s length transactions where ownership is more profitable but also more costly due to
a higher required set-up cost. As Figure 1 illustrates, FDI is preferred if
Vi (q) > Vo (q) ⇔ q > qi = ki/ (πni − πno ) . (4)
When a firm is born, it expects with density g (q) to be of type q. In choosing ki or
ko = 0, it adopts an organizational form, outsourcing or FDI. At the start, a new firm
chooses outsourcing if q < qi, and expects to earn πno with probability so,
so =
Z qi
0
qdG (q) , si =
Z 1
qi
qdG (q) , Ki =
Z 1
qi
kidG (q) . (5)
Due to early stage failure (at rates 1 − q), so + si < 1. Since ko = 0 by normalization,
aggregate early stage investment Ki stems from firms preparing for FDI only.
Prior to learning its type, the expected net present value of a new firm is
V¯ =
Z qi
0
Vo (q) dG (q) +
Z 1
qi
Vi (q) dG (q) = soπno + siπ
n
i −Ki > 0. (6)
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Since all final goods producers are located in the North, V¯ is also aggregate profit income.
The key part of the analysis refers to investment, employment and production decisions
in the South where components are produced with much lower labor cost. We focus on
the case where investment is externally financed at the margin and is subject to finance
constraints. We first turn to outsourcing relationships with independent subcontractors
in the South. The price chosen in an outsourcing relationship where the Northern firm
trades with an independent subcontractor, is the arm’s length price (ALP).
1
n
i iq kπ⋅ −
outsourcing
n
oq π⋅
iq
ik FDI
Figure 1: Choice of Organizational Form
2.2 Outsourcing
Investment and Financing: Independent subcontracting firms in the South earn a
price zo on their output and pay an upfront royalty ro, as specified in the outsourcing
contract. Firms have own wealth A. After paying the royalty, they are left with A − ro
to self-finance part of expansion investment Io. The remaining part Do = Io − A + ro is
borrowed externally. To manage variable expansion investment, the entrepreneur incurs
an eﬀort cost cIo. Investment succeeds with probability p which is the same across firms
and statistically independent, and fails with probability 1− p. Depending on the level of
investment, the firm generates a cash-flow voIo if successful. In the absence of depreciation,
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end of period value is Io + voIo. The tax liability T eo is specified below. When the firm is
successful, it pays back debt plus interest as well as tax, and is left with V eo . The surplus
of the firm, πeo, the bank, πbo, and the joint private surplus πo are:
πeo = pV
e
o − cIo −A, V eo = Io + voIo − (1 + i)Do − T eo ,
πbo = p (1 + i)Do −Do, Do = Io −A+ ro, (7)
πo = [(1 + vo) p− c− 1] Io − ro − pT eo .
Adding the expected net present value of tax Geo = pT eo yields a social surplus π∗o =
[(1 + vo) p− c− 1] Io − ro. Since nothing is paid back by failed firms, banks must charge
a loan rate i > 0 to cover losses from credit defaults. With perfect competition among
banks, the zero profit loan rate is (1 + i) p = 1. The deposit rate is normalized to zero.
The loan rate reflects an intermediation margin which must cover the credit losses from
defaulting firms.
The tax liability of the subcontractor is assumed to be T e = τ s [vI − i (D +A)− r],
implying that the costs of both debt and equity finance are deductible.5 We assume that
upfront royalties are not immediately deductible but only when income is received in the
success state. Using D = I −A+ r, then
T eo = τ
s [(vo − i) Io − (1 + i) ro] .
Expected tax payment is pT eo = pτ s (vo − i) Io − τ sro when banks are competitive and
(1 + i) p = 1.
5A more common tax code would be T e = τ s [vI − iD − r] which would introduce a constant iA in
subsequent analysis. Although more complicated, the results remain qualitatively the same. Since the
focus of the paper is not on the tax eﬀects on investment, we adopt this major simplification. Note that
in both formulations, investment is 100% debt financed at the margin since internal equity is a constant.
The eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR) would thus be zero in both formulations even if deduction of
iA were excluded. To relate to neoclassical theory, replace vI by concave cash-flow v (I) and set c = 0.
Noting how D and T increase with I, maximizing V e yields v0 (I) = i. The user cost of capital is i and
EMTR is zero in both cases.
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Perfect competition among banks forces down the loan rate and allows them to perform
no better than break-even, πbo = 0. Using (1 + i) p = 1 and substituting for tax T eo yields
a private surplus of
πeo = πo = [(1− τ s) (vo − i) p− c] Io − (1− τ s) ro. (8)
To restrict attention to a finance-constrained equilibrium, we further assume
pc
p− pL
> p (1− τ s) (vo − i) > c > pL (1− τ s) (vo − i) . (A)
The second inequality implies that the net present value increases when firms expand
investment, i.e. dπo/dIo > 0. The last inequality says that the marginal net present value
is negative when the success probability is low.
When banks are competitive, subcontractors appropriate the entire surplus. Since the
surplus rises with investment, firms want to invest as much as possible. However, loan size
must also be incentive compatible to assure a high success probability since the project
would not be profitable with a low success probability,
ICe : p · V eo − cIo > pL · V eo ⇔ V eo > γIo. (9)
where γ ≡ c/(p− pL). The entrepreneur must keep a large enough stake for lending to be
incentive compatible. Since V e declines with debt, the firm’s debt capacity is limited by
(1 + i)Do 6 [1 + i+ (1− τ s) (vo − i)− γ] Io + (1 + i) τ sro. (10)
Given γ > (1− τ s) (vo − i) by the first inequality of assumption (A), higher investment
raises the required debt repayment faster than the firm’s debt capacity on the right hand
side. Investment is expanded until the inequality binds which determines the maximum
incentive compatible investment level
Io = m (zo) · [A− (1− τ s) ro] , m (zo) ≡ 1 + iγ − (1− τ s) (vo − i) . (11)
The ALP aﬀects the multiplier via vo = v (zo) as in (1). The multiplier is positive on
account of the first inequality in (A).
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We wish to focus on finance constrained equilibria. The first two inequalities in (A)
importantly depend on c and pL. A positive value of pL is required to open an interval
[c, cp/ (p− pL)], which gets infinitely large when pL → p. If one sets vo such that the term
in the c-interval approaches the upper bound, the multiplier m gets infinitely large. A
realistic equilibrium will have a multiplier moderately above one, implying that a marginal
increase in own equity A by one unit raises investment by more than one, i.e. additional
equity is positively leveraged with external debt. We thus consider a situation with a
not too high value of pL and an equilibrium value of vo such that the multiplier exceeds
one (the term p (1− τ s) (vo − i) is close to the upper bound) and, simultaneously, the net
present value of marginal investment is negative when the success probability is low (last
inequality is satisfied).
Outsourcing Contract: With outsourcing, the innovator does not invest her own
wealth but instead buys from an independent subcontractor by oﬀering a contract zo
and ro. To finance investment, the subcontractor injects her own assets and raises exter-
nal funds. The parent firm in the North collects royalty income, earns profits from its
final goods division, and pays tax Tno = τ [(β − zo) xop+ ro]. The expected net profit is πno
as in (2) since repatriated dividends are zero when outsourcing. Given that the parent’s
project is of type q, the net present value is
Vo (q) = q · πno , πno = (1− τ) [(β − zo)xop+ ro] . (12)
Adding initial wealth A yields the innovator’s end of period utility Vo +A = qπno +A.
When oﬀering an outsourcing contract zo and ro, the parent firm fully anticipates the
subcontractor’s behavior resulting in a delivery xo = f (lo) Io which determines her own
profits from final goods production. The contract must also fulfill the subcontractor’s
participation constraint, V eo = πo +A > A, or πo > 0.
Proposition 1 The optimal outsourcing contract zo, ro satisfies
zo = β, ro = [(1− τ s) (vo − i) p− c] Io/ (1− τ s) . (13)
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Proof. The optimal contract zo, ro solves $ = πno +μoπeo, where πeo = πo. Suppressing
the index o for the moment, the Lagrangean is
$ = (1− τ) [(β − z) px+ r] + μ {[(1− τ s) (v (z)− i) p− c] I − (1− τ s) r} .
Note the solutions l (z), I (z, r), x (z, r) = f (l (z)) I (z, r) as well as v0 (z) = f (l). In
general, τ 6= τ s. The optimality conditions for the contract are
z : [1− τ − (1− τ s)μ] px = (1− τ) (β − z) pdx
dz
+ μ [(1− τ s) (v − i) p− c] dI
dz
, (i)
r : [1− τ − (1− τ s)μ] = − (1− τ) (β − z) pdx
dr
− μ [(1− τ s) (v − i) p− c] dI
dr
. (ii)
The royalty r does not aﬀect l, f (l) and v. Using (1 + i) p = 1, we have
dm
dv
= (1− τ s)m2p, dI
dz
= (1− τ s)mpx, dI
dr
= − (1− τ s)m. (iii)
The eﬀect on output of components, x = f (l) I is more complicated. Using (iii),
dx
dz
= (1− τ s) f (l)mpx+ If 0 (l) l0 (z) , dx
dr
= − (1− τ s)mf (l) . (iv)
Evaluating the f.o.c.’s, and multiplying the second by px, yields
1− τ − (1− τ s)
(1− τ) (1− τ s) μ− μ
[(1− τ s) (v − i) p− c]m
1− τ = (β − z)
∙
pmf +
f 0l0
(1− τ s) f
¸
, (v)
1− τ − (1− τ s)
(1− τ) (1− τ s) μ− μ
[(1− τ s) (v − i) p− c]m
1− τ = (β − z) pmf.
The left hand side is the same in both equations. Since f 0l0 > 0, they can thus hold
simultaneously only if both sides are zero, giving
zo = β, μo =
(1− τ) / (1− τ s)
1 + [(1− τ s) (vo − i) p− c]mo
. (vi)
Given a positive shadow price, the participation constraint yields the royalty in (13).
Substituting the zero profit royalty in (13) into the investment condition (11), and
using the definition of mo and (1 + i) p = 1 yields
Io =
mo
1 + [(1− τ s) (vo − i) p− c]mo
A =
p− pL
cpL
A. (14)
With zero profits in the South, supplier investment is independent of the ALP and royalty.
Given the optimal ALP, the innovator’s surplus from outsourcing amounts to
πno = (1− τ) · ro =
1− τ
1− τ s · [(1− τ
s) (vo − i) p− c] Io. (15)
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2.3 Direct Investment
When assessing a multinational, the government in the North observes arm’s length mar-
ket prices zo and royalties ro by outsourcing firms that are otherwise comparable. It will
be shown below that MNE firms optimally choose diﬀerent prices zi > zo and ri < ro
for purely economic reasons of internal eﬃciency, even in the absence of taxes. These
prices, however, also have the side eﬀect of shifting profits to the South where investment
must be financed. Profit shifting, in turn, may lead governments in the North to impose
the arm’s length principle to protect their tax base and secure more tax revenue.6 Tax
liability of the parent becomes
Gni = τ · [(β − φzzi)xip+ φrri + (1− φr) ro] , φz, φr ≤ 1. (16)
If the φ-coeﬃcients are set to unity, transfer prices and royalties of the MNE are not
disputed, leaving Gni = τ [(β − zi)xip+ ri]. However, in reducing φ below unity, the
government marginally applies the ALP by using observed market prices and royalties in
outsourcing relationships to calculate the tax liability. In the extreme case, if φz = zo/zi
and φr = 0, the tax liability becomes Gni = τ [(β − zo)xip+ ro], meaning that the ALP
is fully imposed by recognizing only observed market prices rather than prices chosen by
the MNE firm. We are concerned with marginally imposing ALPs by considering small
deviations from φz = φr = 1.
An MNE’s global net of tax profit amounts to πni = (β − zi)xip + ri + πsi − Gni .
Following practice in the vast majority of countries7, repatriated dividends are assumed
to be tax exempt. Using (16), global net of tax profits amount to
πni = π
s
i + [(1− τ)β − (1− φzτ) zi] pxi + (1− φrτ) ri − (1− φr) τro. (17)
Subsidiary profits in the South (indexed by s) is paid back to the Northern parent either
6We henceforth use ALP to refer to both ‘arm’s length principle’ and ‘arm’s length price’, except when
the meaning appears ambiguous.
7As of 2009, the USA and Japan are the only large countries to maintain taxation of worldwide income,
instead of primarily exempting foreign source dividends.
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as a tax exempt dividend πsi or as a royalty ri which is subject to tax. The net present
value of a type q firm choosing the FDI mode is Vi (q) = qπni − ki.
Subsidiary Investment: The subsidiary in the South earns a cash-flow vi (zi) per unit
of invested capital. The last term (1− φr) τro in (16) is like a lump-sum tax to be paid
out of free cash-flow as well. After self-financing early stage investment and paying the
upfront tax liability on royalties, the parent is left with free cash-flow An as defined in (18)
below. Finally, the MNE may request its own subsidiary to pay royalties. This, however,
raises the financing needs of the subsidiary to Ii+ri in total. A part An is self-financed by
the parent while the remaining part is borrowed externally. The subsidiary’s tax liability
in the South amounts to T si = τ s [(vi − i) Ii − (1 + i) ri], following the same approach as
in the outsourcing case. In case of success, the subsidiary manager earns V si , giving,
πsi = pV
s
i − cIi −An, V si ≡ (1 + vi) Ii − (1 + i)Di − T si ,
πbi = p (1 + i)Di −Di, Di ≡ Ii + ri −An, An ≡ A− ki − (1− φr) τro, (18)
πi = [(1 + vi) p− c− 1] Ii − ri − pT si .
Adding the net present value of expected tax revenue Gsi = pT si yields the social surplus
π∗i = [(1 + vi) p− c− 1] Ii − ri. Again, the zero profit condition in banking fixes the loan
rate, (1 + i) p = 1, and the subsidiary repatriates dividends equal to the entire net of tax
surplus πsi = πi. By acquiring ownership in the foreign plant, the MNE firm can extract
the surplus from component production either as ex post dividends or ex ante royalties,
πi + ri = [(1 + vi) p− c− 1] Ii − Gsi . If she had opted for outsourcing instead, her only
instrument to extract profits would be to charge a high royalty.
Given an FDI contract with zi and ri, the manager’s incentive constraint is V si > γIi
as before. The incentive pay to the manager limits the subsidiary’s pledgeable income
to (1 + i)Di 6 (1 + vi) Ii − T si − γIi. Borrowing is expanded until pledgeable income is
exhausted and the financing constraint holds with equality. Substituting debt and tax
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liability yields
Ii = m (zi) · [An − (1− τ s) ri] , m (zi) ≡ 1 + iγ − (1− τ s) (vi − i) . (19)
Investment is now controlled by the FDI contract specifying zi and ri.
FDI Contract: The parent sets a transfer price and a royalty to maximize global profit
net of tax. The firm fully anticipates how it thereby controls subsidiary behavior. Note
also that the firm must give up dividend income when it requests a higher royalty.
Proposition 2 In a neighborhood of φz = φr = 1 and given the assumption τ > τ s, the
optimal FDI contract satisfies
zi > zo = β, ri = 0 < ro. (20)
Proof. Given zi and ri, the subsidiary chooses l (zi), I (zi, ri), x (zi, ri) = f (li) Ii and
earns πsi = [(1− τ s) (vi − i) p− c] Ii − (1− τ s) ri. Further, v0 (zi) = f (li). Suppressing
index i for the moment, a variation in contract terms changes global profits in (17) by
dπni
dzi
= (φzτ − τ s) px+ [(1− τ)β − (1− φzτ) z] p
dx
dz
+ [(1− τ s) (v − i) p− c] dI
dz
, (i)
dπni
dri
= − (φrτ − τ s) + [(1− τ)β − (1− φzτ) z] p
dx
dr
+ [(1− τ s) (v − i) p− c] dI
dr
. (ii)
The first terms reflect gains from direct profit shifting. The royalty r does not aﬀect l,
f (l) and v, because it is paid upfront. We note dm/dv = (1− τ s) pm2, leading to
dI
dr
= − (1− τ s)m, dI
dz
= (1− τ s)mpx. (iii)
The eﬀect on component output x = f (l) I is
dx
dr
= − (1− τ s)mf, dx
dz
= (1− τ s) f (l)mpx+ If 0 (l) l0 (z) . (iv)
Evaluating dπni /dzi = 0 by substituting the derivatives in (iii-iv), the optimal transfer
price in the FDI mode satisfies
(1− φzτ) z − (1− τ)β =
(φzτ − τ s) + [(1− τ s) (v − i) p− c] (1− τ s)m
(1− τ s) fpm+ f 0l0/f . (v)
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Noting that all terms on the right hand side are positive yields zi > β if φz is near unity.
Evaluating dπni /dri and using (iii-iv) as well as (v) yields, after some manipulations,
dπn
dr
= (φz − φr) τ − [(1− φzτ) z − (1− τ)β] f 0l0/f < 0 ⇒ r = 0. (vi)
The square bracket is strictly positive by (v). With φz, φr close to unity, the derivative is
negative, giving a corner solution. Since royalties reduce investment and output x = fI,
they also reduce global profit and are thus optimally set to zero.
Clearly, the above results hold in the absence of taxes. Intuitively, an upfront royalty
would only raise the need for external financing. Given a fixed borrowing capacity, de-
manding a royalty payment upfront crowds out investment while ex post dividends avoid
this. Consequently, the parent firm optimally sets the royalty to zero, and instead obtains
the subsidiary’s profit as an ex post, risky dividend. This option is not open with an
outsourcing relationship since the final goods firm has no ownership in this case. The
only way to extract profits from independent subcontracting firms is to pay a low ALP
and charge a high royalty. The outsourcing contract reflects the optimal way to do so.
The optimal transfer price chosen by MNE firms is higher than the ALP in outsourcing
relationships, zi > β. In shifting profits, the parent can boost the subsidiary’s pledgeable
income and relax the borrowing constraint. To see this, consider the tax parameters
as mentioned in the Proposition. The direct eﬀect of a higher transfer price is to shift
taxable profit which corresponds to the first term in (20.i). If φz = 1 and τ > τ s, MNE
firms find it optimal to raise the transfer price for tax reasons in order to shift profits to
the low tax country and thereby reduce the global tax bill. According to this standard
argument in the tax literature, imposing the ALP by reducing φz would contain profit
shifting and protect the tax base. This tax induced profit shifting incentive is eliminated
when tax rates are equal, making the ALP redundant. However, transfer prices serve
important economic functions. Imposing the ALP impairs internal eﬃciency of MNEs. A
first behavioral eﬀect is that paying a higher transfer price induces subsidiaries to supply
a larger quantity. Starting from zi = β, the firm incurs a zero loss to the first order in
her final goods division when tax rates are symmetric.
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A second behavioral eﬀect is that the transfer price boosts pledgeable income of the
subsidiary company and thereby allows for more borrowing and investment. Since the
firm is credit constrained in the first place, the relaxation of the financing constraint
yields a first order increase in subsidiary profits equal to (1− τ s) vp − 1 − c per unit of
capital as in the third term of (20.i). This gain is related to the fact that more investment
is socially profitable (see assumption A) but the firm can leverage its own funds only to
a limited extent. By shifting profits from the final goods division to the subsidiary where
investment needs to be financed, the parent can relax a financing constraint and thereby
boost global profits. It is thus optimal to raise the transfer price above the marginal
product β. However, as the transfer price is raised further, it increasingly distorts the
optimal use of components in final goods assembly which cuts into worldwide profits. As
the losses in the final goods division become large, a further increase in the transfer price
eventually becomes undesirable.
Consider now how MNE firms reduce the transfer price when the government in the
North imposes the ALP. To analyze policy shocks, as in section 3 below, we log-linearize
the model. The hat notation indicates percentage changes relative to the initial situation,
e.g. xˆ ≡ dx/x. Exceptions to the rule will be specially noted.
Proposition 3 In a neighborhood of φz = φr = 1, the transfer price under FDI falls
when the tax authority applies the ALP in assessing the value of components (φˆz < 0),
zˆi = εφ · φˆz, εφ > 0. (21)
Applying the ALP in assessing royalty income (φˆr < 0) has no impact on transfer prices.
Proof. The optimality condition in (20.i) is dπni /dzi ≡ ζ (zi;φz) = 0. Applying the
implicit function theorem yields comparative statics in φz. The second order condition
d2πni /dz2i = dζ/dzi ≡ ζz < 0 pins down the sign of the eﬀects. Using (20.i,iii,iv) yields
ζ (zi;φz) = (φzτ − τ s) pxi + [(1− τ s) (vi − i) p− c] (1− τ s)mipxi (i)
: + [(1− τ)β − (1− φzτ) zi] [(1− τ s) fimip+ f 0i l0i/fi] pxi = 0.
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The condition depends on φr only via its impact on investment Ii and, in turn, on xi.
Since xi cancels from (i), φr has no eﬀect on xi, i.e. dζ/dφr = 0. The transfer price is
independent of φr. Since xi, Ii and mi depend only on foreign taxes, the impact of φz is
dζ
dφz
≡ ζφ = τpxi · [1 + zi · ((1− τ s) fipmi + f 0i l0i/fi)] > 0. (ii)
The implicit function theorem thus implies dzi/dφz = −ζφ/ζz, which yields (21) with the
elasticity defined as εφ ≡ −φzζφ/ (ziζz) > 0.
Relative Profits: To choose the value maximizing organizational form, the parent firm
must compare global profits under outsourcing and FDI.
Proposition 4 In a neighborhood of φz = φr = 1 and τ = τ s, and with ki not too large,
global expected profits with FDI are strictly larger than with outsourcing, πni > πno .
Proof. Setting tax parameters as mentioned, (11-13) give the parent’s global profit
with outsourcing while (17), πsi as noted after (20), and (19) together with ri = 0 and
An = A− ki yield global profits with FDI,
πno = (1− τ) (β − zo) pxo + [(1− τ) (vo − i) p− c]mo [A− (1− τ) ro] , (i)
πni = (1− τ) (β − zi) pxi + [(1− τ) (vi − i) p− c]mi (A− ki) . (ii)
Start with a situation of ki = (1− τ) ro and zi = zo = β, implying vi = vo and mi = mo.
This leads to πni = πno since all terms are identical. Consider first the eﬀect of having a
smaller start-up cost (ki < (1− τ) ro ‘not too large’). This has no impact on vi (since
it does not depend on ki) but raises free cash-flow which, in turn, boosts investment in
(19) and global profits under FDI. The first step thus raises πni relative to πno . Second,
optimally raise the transfer price to a level zi > β as in (20) while the firm sets zo = β
under outsourcing. Since zi is chosen to maximize global profits, moving towards the
higher optimal price again raises profits from FDI relative to outsourcing. By continuity,
the same arguments also hold for small deviations from symmetric tax parameters.
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2.4 Equilibrium and Welfare
The firm in the North chooses FDI if it yields the largest end of period wealth. The net
present value of going multinational is Vi (q) = qπni − ki, while outsourcing yields a value
Vo (q) = qπno . Once the start-up phase is successfully completed, FDI is more profitable,
πni > πno . However, FDI requires a larger early stage investment, ki > 0. Figure 1 in section
2.1 illustrates the decomposition of Northern firms by organizational form. Only the best
firms, those with the highest probability q of surviving the start-up phase, prefer FDI
while the less profitable ones with a smaller expected profit prefer outsourcing. Equation
(5) computes the shares of multinational and outsourcing companies among all new firms,
and (6) states the expected net present value of a new firm before it has learned the type
q of its project.
The model is recursive. Labor earns a fixed wage w in the South where there is
free mobility between a Ricardian sector and the component industry serving Northern
final goods producers. The fiscal budget closes the model. Given our focus on eﬃciency
rather than distribution, we assume that tax revenue is rebated lump-sum. Hence, Gn =
soGno + siGni is the transfer per capita, and similarly in the South:
Gn = τ [(β − zo) pxo + ro] · so + τ [(β − φzzi) pxi + (1− φr) ro] · si, (22)
Gs = τ s [p (vo − i) Io − ro] · so + τ sp (vi − i) Ii · si,
where An = A − ki − τ (1− φr) ro. Note zi > zo = β and ro > ri = 0 in equilibrium.
Assuming the exemption principle in place, repatriated dividends from foreign subsidiaries
are not taxed in the North. The government in the South is, of course, not concerned with
the ALP since profit shifting anyway works in its favor. The Appendix shows Walras’
Law to illustrate the market structure and trade balances.
Welfare equals income minus eﬀort costs. Since Vj is net of eﬀort cost and represents
a surplus over initial assets, expected utility and aggregate welfare in the North are
Ωn = A+Gn + V¯ , V¯ = soπno + siπ
n
i −Ki. (23)
Since asset endowment is fixed, welfare changes along with Gn + V¯ .
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3 Implications of the Arm’s Length Principle
Oﬀshoring occurs either at arm’s length with independent suppliers or in a vertically
integrated multinational firm with a wholly owned foreign subsidiary. These organizations
set entirely diﬀerent component prices and royalties. To investigate the ALP, we start
from a situation of φz = φr = 1, where tax authorities do not dispute private tax reports,
and then consider marginal reductions of φz, φr. Tax rates are kept constant throughout.
To simplify, we mostly consider symmetric tax rates τ = τ s.
3.1 Investment and Profit
Applying the ALP is not relevant for outsourcing relationships. Given constant tax rates,
the policy has no eﬀect on investment of subcontractors and neither on profits, royalties
and tax payments in both locations, see (14-15). By way of contrast, the ALP directly
aﬀects multinationals and their relations to foreign subsidiaries. The tax penalty on the
higher transfer price of multinationals leads them to set a lower price, see (21), which
erodes the subsidiary’s cash-flow by v0 (zi) = fi:
zˆi = εφφˆz, vˆi = (zifi/vi) · zˆi. (24)
Obviously, the lower transfer price reduces profit shifting, not only because firms charge
and report a lower price but also because firms produce and import less.
A smaller cash-flow diminishes the subsidiary’s borrowing capacity, leading to lower
investment. The parent sets the optimal royalty to zero, earning all surplus with dividends,
so that (19) gives Ii = miAn with An = A− ki − (1− φr) τro. Evaluating at φr = 1, the
investment response is Iˆi = mˆi + (τro/An) φˆr. Since mˆi = (1− τ s)mivip · vˆi,
Iˆi = (1− τ s)mipzifi · zˆi + (τro/An) · φˆr. (25)
Forcing the investor to pay tax on fictitious royalty income reduces the MNE’s free cash-
flow and, thereby, self-financing. Investment declines since it is a constant leverage of
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own equity. When tax liability is based on a lower ALP for components, the resulting
tax penalty leads the parent firm to set a lower transfer price. Investment again falls on
account of lower pledgeable income which limits external leverage.
Subsidiary profits are πsi = [(1− τ s) (vi − i) p− c] Ii, as noted below (20) with ri = 0.
Taking the diﬀerential yields dπsi = [(1− τ s) (vi − i) p− c] Ii · Iˆi + (1− τ s) pIizifi · zˆi.
Substitute (25) and use 1 + [(1− τ s) (vi − i) p− c]mi = miγpL,
dπsi = miγpL · (1− τ s) pzixi · zˆi + τro (πsi/An) · φˆr. (26)
Imposing the ALP erodes subsidiary profits, leading to smaller dividend repatriations.
First, the tax penalty leads the parent firm to set a lower transfer price which cuts
subsidiary earnings from component production. Second, imposing the ALP discourages
investment which again subtracts from subsidiary profit.
By the envelope theorem, a variation of zi has no impact on consolidated MNE profit.
We need to consider only the direct derivatives of (17-18). Note thatmi and li depend only
on zi but not on domestic tax parameters while investment Ii and, thus, xi = f (li) Ii,
additionally reflect the tax penalty of applying the ALP on royalties, see (25). Given
optimal ri = 0, using (26), and evaluating at φz = φr = 1 so that φˆj = dφj, yields8
dπni = τpxizi · φˆz + τro (1 + πni /An) · φˆr. (27)
Imposing the ALP directly raises the tax liability. Global net profit of the MNE firm
further declines because it squeezes subsidiary investment which is already finance con-
strained even in the absence of tax.
3.2 Firm Decomposition
Imposing the ALP reduces global profits in the FDI mode. Figure 1 illustrates how
this change in relative profits discourages FDI and pushes firms into the outsourcing
8We get dπni = τpxizi ·φˆz+τro [1 + πsi/An + (1− τ) (β − zi) pxi/An]·φˆr. The result obtains by noting
that (1− τ) (β − zi) pxi = πni − πsi holds in the initial equilibrium.
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mode. Analytically, tax policy changes the outsourcing versus FDI margin in (4) by
qˆi = −dπni / (πni − πno ), giving
qˆi = −
τpxizi
πni − πno
· φˆz −
τro (1 + πni /An)
πni − πno
· φˆr. (28)
Tax policy thus changes the composition of the business sector by organizational form.
Using gi = g (qi), the diﬀerential of (5) yields
sˆo =
q2i gi
so
· qˆi, sˆi = −q
2
i gi
si
· qˆi, Kˆi = −ki qigiKi · qˆi. (29)
Obviously, the change in shares satisfies dso + dsi = 0. Since individual start-up cost is
fixed, and normalized to zero for outsourcing firms, the impact on aggregate early stage
investment only reflects changes in group size.
3.3 Tax Revenue
North: Welfare partly depends on tax revenue. Revenues reflect intensive (tax per firm)
and extensive responses (composition eﬀects). Tax liability of an MNE partly reflects
subsidiary output: xi = f (li) Ii and xˆi = fˆi+ Iˆi. Specifying f (l) = l1−α, the employment
condition zf 0 (l) = w yields lˆ = zˆ/α. Output changes by fˆi = (1− α) lˆi = zˆi · (1− α) /α.
Also note l0f 0/f = (1− α) / (αzi) for later reference. Substituting (25) gives
xˆi = ξi · zˆi + (τro/An) · φˆr, ξi ≡
1− α
α
+ (1− τ s)mipzifi > 0, (30)
where zˆi = εφφˆz by (24). Applying the ALP on transfer prices and royalty income leads
to lower investment and subsidiary output which limits profit shifting and reduces the
loss of the home division.
Repatriated dividends are assumed tax exempt. Tax liability per MNE firm in the
North is Gni = τ [(β − φzzi) pxi + (1− φr) ro], where ro is invariant to the policy change
and ri = 0. Tax revenue thus changes by dGni = τpxi
h
(β − zi) xˆi − zizˆi − ziφˆz
i
− τroφˆr.
Substituting the output response above yields
dGni = − [(zi − β) ξiεφ + (1 + εφ) zi] τpxiφˆz − [1 + (zi − β) τpxi/An] τroφˆr. (31)
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Imposition of the ALP thus raises tax revenue extracted from MNEs in the North. Re-
flecting intensive and extensive responses, total revenue collected from all firms in the
North changes by (note Gno = τro > 0 > Gni = −τ (zi − β) pxi)
Gn = soGno + siG
n
i , dG
n = (Gno −Gni ) qigidqi + sidGni . (32)
South: Tax from subcontracting firms is fixed, Gso = τ s (vo − i) pIo−τ sro. Since it pays
no royalty, tax liability of a foreign subsidiary is Gsi = τ s (vi − i) pIi > Gso. The inequality
holds since vi > vo due to a higher price zi, and Ii > Io on account of the arguments given
in Proposition 4. Since outsourcing firms are not aﬀected, dGso = 0, total revenue from
the source tax is
Gs = soGso + siG
s
i , dG
s = (Gso −Gsi ) qigidqi + sidGsi . (33)
Source tax revenue depends on Northern policy towards ALPs. The tax liability of sub-
sidiaries changes by dGsi = τ sp
h
viIivˆi + (vi − i) IiIˆi
i
. Substituting earlier results yields
dGsi = [1 + (1− τ s) (vi − i) pmi] τ spzixi · zˆi + (vi − i) τ spmi · τro · φˆr. (34)
A higher transfer price inflates taxable subsidiary profits since it boosts cash-flow and
also stimulates investment in the South. Imposing the ALP on royalties reduces free-cash
flow of parent companies, leading them to cut back on borrowing and investment.
World: Tax policy in the North changes worldwide tax revenue by dG = dGn+dGs or,
using (32-33), dG = (Go −Gi) qigidqi+si (dGni + dGsi ), where Go = Gno+Gso and similarly
forGi. Substitute earlier results and recall that the initial equilibrium is assumed symmet-
ric, τ = τ s. The optimality condition (20.v), if evaluated with symmetric tax parameters,
and the coeﬃcient ξi defined in (30) imply (zi − β) ξi = [(1− τ) (vi − i) p− c]mizi. Also
use vi = zifi − wli. Worldwide tax revenue is found to change by
dG = (Go −Gi) qigidqi + (cmiεφ − 1) τpzixisiφˆz (35)
: + [(βfi − wli − i) τpmi − 1] τrosiφˆr.
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To sign the compositional eﬀect, we need to rank worldwide tax collected from firms
in the outsourcing and FDI mode. Adding Gno = τro and Gso = τ [(vo − i) pIo − ro] yields
world tax revenue Go and, similarly for Gi = Gni +Gsi ,
Gi = τ (βfi − wli − i) pIi > Go = τ (βfo − wlo − i) pIo, (36)
where Ii = mi (A− ki) and Io = mo (A− (1− τ) ro). To show this, note that Go is a con-
stant. We restrict attention only to equilibria with an interior solution of organizational
choice, πni > πno . Proposition 4 shows that this requires zi > β or ki < (1− τ) ro. The last
condition implies Ii > Io and, thus, Gi > Go at zi = β. To compute how Gi = Gni + Gsi
rises with zi, substitute (34) and dGni = − [(zi − β) ξi + zi] τpxizˆ from (31), and get
dGi = τpxi [(1− τ) (vi − i) pmizi − (zi − β) ξi] zˆi. Clearly, dGi > 0 at zi = β since vi > i.
As was noted prior to (35), the optimal zi fulfills (zi − β) ξi = [(1− τ) (vi − i) p− c]mizi,
so that dGi|z∗i = τpmizixiczˆi. Since global tax revenue still increases with zi at the
optimal value z∗i , we have shown that Gi > Go must hold in equilibrium.
3.4 National Welfare
Tax policy aﬀects welfare by dΩn = dGn+dV¯ as in (23). Using dso = qigidqi = −dsi as well
as dKi = −kigidqi, the change in expected firm value follows from the diﬀerential dV¯ =
− [(πni − πno ) qi − ki] gidqi + sodπno + sidπni . The square bracket is zero by organizational
choice. Profits from outsourcing are not aﬀected. Substituting (27) yields
dV¯ = τpxizisi · φˆz + (1 + πni /An) τrosi · φˆr. (37)
The total welfare eﬀect obtains by substituting (31-32) and (37) into dΩn = dGn + dV¯ .
Canceling mechanical eﬀects and using Ii = miAn yields
dΩn = (Gno −Gni ) qigidqi − [(zi − β) ξi + zi] τpxisiεφφˆz (38)
: + [πni − τ (zi − β) pxi] (τrosi/An) φˆr.
The last term reflects the impact of forcing MNEs to declare fictitious royalty income.
There are two opposing eﬀects. First, imposing the ALP on royalties boosts national tax
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revenue and welfare. Apart from the direct gain in tax revenue collected from the MNE
operation at home, it also reduces the scale of production xi and thereby cuts the losses
in the domestic final goods division which further boosts tax revenue. Second, the policy
reduces national welfare on account of a lower expected firm value V¯ , reflecting a lower
global profit πni in the MNE mode. Again, this lower profit reflects the direct tax eﬀect
and, in addition, the lower dividend repatriations because it reduces subsidiary investment
in the South. The net eﬀect in (38) is negative, implying lower national welfare in the
North, as long as global MNE profits before domestic tax are positive.9
Consider now the total welfare consequences of marginally imposing the ALP by only
partially recognizing transfer prices reported by multinational firms, φˆz < 0. The scenario
similarly distorts the extensive and intensive margins. It pushes a margin of firms from
FDI into outsourcing mode, dqi > 0 in (28). Now, the North reaps a welfare gain equal
to (Gno −Gni ) qigidqi since outsourcing firms pay more tax than MNEs. As a further
behavioral eﬀect, the tax penalty leads firms to reduce the transfer price zi. In the MNE
optimum, global profits are unaﬀected at the margin since the increased loss at home
is just oﬀset by an increased profit abroad. However, for any given transfer price zi,
the policy directly raises tax revenue since only a smaller part of the total cost zixi for
components can be deducted from tax. The increase in tax liability corresponds to the
term involving zi in the first line of 38). The revenue gain is further magnified by the fact
that the lower transfer price reduces component production by xˆi = ξizˆi which limits the
losses in the home division and thus boosts tax revenue (the term proportional to zi−β).
Proposition 5 Imposing the ALP on component pricing (φˆz < 0) reduces transfer prices
and pushes firms from FDI into outsourcing. National welfare in the North increases.
A tax on fictitious royalty income directly redistributes from multinationals to the
government. Although the policy does not distort component prices, it does discriminate
9Substitute πni = π
s
i − (1− τ) (zi − β) pxi from (17) and get pre tax profit [πni − τ (zi − β) pxi] =
πsi − (zi − β) pxi which necessarily must be positive in an equilibrium without taxes.
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against subsidiary investment. MNEs optimally do not claim royalty income but rather
prefer ex post dividends in order to relax the external financing constraint of their sub-
sidiaries. The tax penalty on royalties does the opposite. It reduces free cash-flow and
thereby impairs the MNE’s borrowing capacity and investment in the subsidiary. There
are thus again two behavioral responses. First, the investment response at the intensive
margin reduces national welfare. Although lower investment cuts losses in the home divi-
sion and thereby strengthens tax revenue, it also reduces repatriated dividends as a source
of national income and welfare. These two eﬀects oﬀset each other. Since investment is
finance constrained, a further reduction of investment strictly reduces global profits before
domestic taxes. The last square bracket in (38) indicates that national welfare falls on this
account as long as MNEs record positive global profits gross of tax. Second, a margin of
firms is again pushed from FDI into outsourcing, dqi > 0. The impact on organizational
form leads to a welfare gain due to the higher tax payment of outsourcing firms compared
to MNEs. The net eﬀect is ambiguous.
Proposition 6 Imposing the ALP on royalty income of MNEs (φˆr < 0) pushes firms
from FDI into outsourcing which boosts national tax revenue and welfare. The policy
also reduces free cash-flow, further distorts MNE investment and lowers welfare. The net
impact on welfare in the North is ambiguous.
3.5 Global Welfare
We have shown that the imposition of ALP on transfer prices for intracompany trade
helps to contain profit shifting and thereby raises welfare in the North. Profit shifting
creates a fiscal spillover. We now show that imposing the ALP leads to a welfare loss
in the South and, more importantly, that this loss exceeds the Northern gain. The ALP
thus results in a net loss of global welfare.
Welfare South: Welfare in the South is equal to the sum of wages, assets and refunded
tax revenue, Ωs = wL + A + Gs. It does not depend on profit income since profits of
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subcontractors are extracted by royalties and profits of foreign subsidiaries are repatriated.
The South collects revenue from the source tax as in (33) and (34). The source tax from
MNE subsidiaries much depends on Northern tax policy via its impact on transfer prices,
zˆi = εφφˆz. Welfare in the South thus changes by
dΩs = − (Gsi −Gso) qigidqi + τ s (vi − i) pmi · τrosiφˆr (39)
: +τ s [1 + (1− τ s) (vi − i) pmi] pzixi · siεφφˆz.
Note that subsidiaries pay more tax per firm in the South compared to subcontractors,
Gsi > Gso, since the higher transfer price zi > β and the reliance of MNEs on dividends
instead of royalties strengthen both cash-flow and investment under FDI. MNEs are better
able to cope with financing constraints and raise more external funds than local firms.
Imposing the ALP on transfer prices induces a margin of firms to shift from FDI to
outsourcing, imposing a loss of tax revenue on the South, − (Gsi −Gso) qigidqi < 0. This
loss in revenue and welfare is reinforced by the induced cut in the transfer price and the
consequent investment reduction so that less profit gets shifted to the South. By enforcing
the ALP, the North creates a strong negative fiscal spillover on the South. Imposing the
ALP on royalties (φˆr < 0) has a similar eﬀect. It pushes firms from FDI into outsourcing
which means less tax to the source country. By reducing subsidiary investment, the North
also narrows the tax base of the source country which further erodes tax revenue. The
South looses on both fronts.
Proposition 7 When the North imposes the ALP on transfer prices and royalties (φˆz < 0
and φˆr < 0), welfare in the South declines.
Global Welfare: Global welfare is Ω∗ = Ωn +Ωs. The change in world welfare reflects
the policy impact on world tax revenue and on aggregate profit income in the North
stemming from royalties and repatriated dividends. Note the assumption of symmetric tax
rates, use the optimality condition (zi − β) ξi = [(1− τ) (vi − i) p− c]mizi, the definition
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of cash-flow vi = zifi − wli, the MNE’s global tax liability Gi in (36), and get
dΩ∗ = − (Gi −Go) qigidqi + (πni +Gi) (τrosi/An) φˆr + τcmizipxisiεφφˆz. (40)
where the coeﬃcient of φˆz is proportional to the global increase in tax liability of a
multinational, as shown after (36).
Again, the impact on global welfare is explained by the intensive and extensive re-
sponses in the business sector. The welfare eﬀect on the extensive margin hinges on the
fact that MNEs globally pay more tax than outsourcing firms, Gi > Go as shown in (36).
The welfare eﬀects on the intensive margins relate to transfer pricing and investment for
component production in the South, and are given by the second and third terms above.
Obviously, a pure redistribution of profits and tax payments between regions, and between
firms and governments, must cancel out in a worldwide perspective.
Applying the ALP means φˆz < 0. The following results are qualitatively the same if
the Northern government applies the ALP on royalty income, φˆr < 0. The tax penalty
on MNEs raises qi, meaning that it pushes a margin of firms from FDI into outsourcing.
The reduced share of MNEs among all firms leads to a loss in global tax revenue and
welfare since MNEs globally pay more tax compared to outsourcing firm. On the intensive
margin, both policies reduce subsidiary investment in (25), either due to firms choosing a
lower transfer price, or by reducing free cash-flow. Since subsidiary investment is finance
constrained, a further reduction of investment leads to lower global pretax income which
erodes the global tax base of MNEs and results in a net loss in worldwide tax revenue.
Global welfare declines.
Proposition 8 Imposing the ALP on transfer prices and royalty income of MNEs reduces
global welfare.
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4 Conclusions
With the international fragmentation of production in a globalized world, collecting cor-
porate tax from multinational firms has become a diﬃcult task in high tax countries.
Unlike national firms, multinational companies can minimize the global tax liability by
shifting profits to low tax locations, leading to substantial revenue losses in high tax coun-
tries. One important channel for profit shifting is transfer pricing for intracompany trade.
A parent company in a high tax country might overpay for components imported from
lightly taxed foreign subsidiaries, thereby shifting profit from high to low tax countries.
Following the OECD Model Tax Convention, the standard approach of tax authorities
is to invoke the arm’s length principle and assess the value of intracompany trade based
on prices in comparable arm’s length relationships. The implicit assumption is that
these prices are the ‘correct’ ones since trade between independent firms is free from any
profit shifting motive. The main argument of the present paper is, however, that arm’s
length prices might well introduce a wrong benchmark in assessing the tax liability of
multinational firms. Multinational companies set transfer prices to eﬃciently coordinate
production units in diﬀerent countries. Transfer prices thus serve an important economic
function and are not merely a tool for tax minimization.
The paper is unique in the literature in studying the implications of the arm’s length
principle in a model where firms can explicitly choose to trade with independent firms
(outsourcing) or with wholly owned subsidiaries (foreign direct investment). In both
cases, we start from the premise that firms ‘in the North’ choose to oﬀshore production of
components ‘to the South’ but may do so in alternative organizational forms. Component
production requires capital and labor. Importantly, independent subcontractors and sub-
sidiary companies need to raise external funds on top of own equity to finance investment.
External funding is subject to finance constraints as emphasized in the corporate finance
literature. To coordinate production, final goods producers oﬀer contracts consisting of
a component price and a royalty payment for the right to produce. These contracts, in
turn, determine the firms’ debt capacity for external financing. In this framework, multi-
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nationals find it easier to overcome finance constraints compared to local subcontracting
firms. Multinationals can shift profits to a subsidiary by paying higher prices for compo-
nents, thereby strengthening pledgeable income and facilitating external financing of the
subsidiary. Furthermore, ownership means that the parent firm does not need royalties
to extract profits since it can always get profits by means of repatriated dividends. In
reducing free cash-flow, royalty payments again impair the subsidiary’s debt capacity. For
both reasons, multinational firms pay rather high transfer prices and set royalties to zero,
instead collecting profits by dividend repatriation. The optimal outsourcing contract in-
stead features lower component prices and higher royalties. Royalties are high because
they are the only way to extract profits, and component prices are lower since the final
goods producer has no interest in shifting profits to independent subcontractors. As a re-
sult, for purely economic reasons, and even in the absence of tax, optimal contracts specify
higher component prices and lower (zero) royalty fees for trade within multinational firms
compared to arm’s length relationships.
In this situation, the arm’s length principle imposes a flawed benchmark in the tax-
ation of multinational firms. Forcing them to assess the value of intermediate imports
at lower arm’s length prices and to declare fictitious royalty income as observed in out-
sourcing relationships imposes a tax penalty on multinational firms. In our framework,
the consequences are the following: (i) the tax penalty leads to lower transfer prices and
less profit shifting; (ii) it reduces, in turn, external debt capacity and investment in the
subsidiary; (iii) it pushes a margin of firms to choose outsourcing rather than foreign
direct investment and thereby distorts the extensive margin of business organization; (iv)
it strengthens tax revenue and raises national welfare in the North; (v) it strongly reduces
tax revenue and welfare in the South; (vi) it leads to a world-wide welfare loss of first
order magnitude. The last result is due to the fact that tax authorities, when observing
arm’s length prices, tend to misinterpret high transfer prices and low royalties as a result
of tax induced profit shifting while, in fact, these choices reflect an eﬃcient organization
of worldwide production by multinational firms.
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Appendix: The World Economy
North: We state Walras’ Law to illustrate the market structure. Welfare is income
minus eﬀort cost. Therefore, the income related to surplus πj is πj + cIj. Welfare in
the North amounts to Ωn = A + Gn + πnoso + πni si − Ki. In case of outsourcing, eﬀort
is expended in the South, so that πno is actual income. The FDI mode yields global
profit net of eﬀort costs equal to πni . Since managerial eﬀort is incurred by the Northern
innovator, actual profit is πni +cIi. Disposable income equal to consumption thus amounts
to Cn = Ωn + cIisi. Substituting the welfare expression, tax revenue Gn, and profits πno
and πni eventually yields
Cn = A−Ki + (β − zo) pxoso + (β − zi) pxisi +B, (A.1)
B ≡ roso + risi + (πsi + cIi) si.
International factor income B consists of royalties and repatriated dividends. In equilib-
rium, ri = 0. A simple rearrangement yields
Y n = A+ β (xoso + xisi) p+B = Cn +Ki + (zoxoso + zixisi) p. (A.2)
National income Y n consists of endowments, manufacturing output and net factor in-
come B from abroad (royalties plus dividends), and is spent on private consumption Cn,
aggregate start-up investment Ki, and intermediate imports due to oﬀshoring.
South: Suppose that labor endowment in the South is L, and there is a mass one of
entrepreneurs with initial wealth A per capita. A share 1−so remains passive and simply
consumes the endowment A. The other share so, equal to the number of firms in the
North choosing outsourcing, enters the subcontracting business and earns end of period
wealth πo+A. Perfect competition reduces the surplus to zero, πo = 0. Aggregate welfare
is income minus eﬀort cost, Ωs = Cs − cIoso, giving
Cs = wL+A+Gs + (1− τ s) [(vo − i) pIo − ro] so. (A.3)
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The last term reflects the break even condition πo = 0 so that the monetary profit must
just compensates for eﬀort cost cIo.
To obtain the income identity in the South, substitute Gs, use B to eliminate roso,
insert the definition of πsi and finally use the cash-flow per firm, vjIj = zjxj − wljIj:
Y s = A+ (zoxoso + zixisi) p+ w [L− (loIoso + liIisi) p]−B (A.4)
= Cs + (1− p) (Ioso + Iisi) .
GNP is spent on private consumption plus depreciated (failed) expansion investment of
foreign owned subsidiaries and local subcontractors. All start-up investment is incurred
in the North. GNP consists of (i) output of the entrepreneurial sector consisting of initial
assets and the value of component production, plus (ii) output of a Ricardian sector which
absorbs all labor not used in component manufacturing (the square bracket), minus (iii)
factor payments B to the North (royalties and repatriated dividends).
Finally, we add up (A.2) and (A.4) to obtain world output market equilibrium:
2A+ β (xoso + xisi) p+ w [L− (loIoso + liIisi) p] = Cn + Cs +Ki + (1− p) (Ioso + Iisi) .
Northern imports, (zoxoso + zixisi) p, cancel with Southern exports, as do capital income
flows B. Aggregate world output of the homogeneous good equals world endowments 2A,
plus the aggregate final output of the industrial sector in the North, plus output of the
Ricardian sector in the South. World demand is for consumption and for aggregate net
investment (start-up in North, plus depreciated expansion investment in the South).
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